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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in the matter, pursuant to Section 
8-2a-3 (2) (f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD) 
Defendant was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel, as 
required by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of 
Utah; in the following ways: 
(a) Failure to assure that a record was made of all bench conferences; 
(b) failure to assure that a record was made of any juror's questions 
during deliberation; 
(c) failure to object to, or adequately answer, questions submitted by the 
jury; 
(d) failure to move for a new trial, based on one juror's comments during 
the polling process. 
"When, as in this case, the claim of ineffective assistance is raised for the 
first time on appeal, we resolve the issue as a matter of law." State v Gallegos, 
967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
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The Trial Court committed clear error by failing to record the bench 
conferences, and address the equivocal comment of Juror Hafen, and by failing 
preserve any communications from the jury during jury deliberations. 
Due process challenges are questions of law that we review applying a 
correction of error standard. See Tolman v Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ISSUES 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing, to keep 
a record, and by failing to move for mistrial on the basis of juror Hafen's 
statement. Specifically: 
(a) Failing to assure that a record was made of all bench conferences; 
(b) failing to assure that a record was made of any juror's questions 
during deliberation; 
(c) failing to object to, or adequately answer, questions submitted by the 
jury; 
(d) and by failing to move for a new trial, based on one juror's comments 
during the polling process. 
See State v Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 11(U Ct App 
1994)QuotingMzrA: VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v Smedley, 792 P.2d 130,134 
(Utah App. 1990) (holding that parties have burden of compiling record '"that 
will adequately preserve their arguments for review in the event of an appeal'") 
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(quoting Franklin Fin. v New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 
1983)). 
The Trial Court committed clear error by failing to record the bench 
conferences, and failing to address the equivocal comment of Juror Hafen, and 
failing to preserve any communications from the jury during deliberations. See 
State v Parker, 2000 UT 51, |6 ,4 P.3d 778. Plain error requires a showing that 
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (iii) the error is harmful; i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome ... (for Defendant)." Id. at |7 (quoting 
State v Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). To show obviousness of the 
error ... (Defendant) must show that the law was clear at the time of trial. See 
State v Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating "error is not plain 
where there was no settled appellate law to guide the trial court"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS 
Tarrell McKay Hughes, Defendant / Appellant, was arrested on December 
31,1995. 
October 23,1997, the Court imposed a prison sentence, and fines, against 
Defendant, but suspended the sentence and ordered Defendant to serve a year in 
the Washington County Jail. [R. 132-35] 
November 24,1997, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal, pro se. [R. 
139] 
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January 6,1998, Order of Dismissal of Appeal for failure to file (a timely) 
Docketing Statement. [R. 161] 
January 21,1998, Reinstatement of Case pursuant to filing of Docketing 
Statement. [R. 162] 
September 15,1998, Order denying motion for remand and ordering 
temporary remand to trial court for determination whether appellant entitled to 
new counsel on appeal. [R. 252] 
November 24,1998, Order Substitution of Counsel. [R 262-263] 
March 24, 1999, Handwritten Letter (from Defendant) requesting New 
Public Defender, (Denied 3-30-99). [R 264] 
April 1,1999, Handwritten Letter (from defendant) requesting hearing on 
denial of counsel, (Denied 4-5-99). [R. 265] 
April 28,1999, Request for Transcripts. [R. 266-267] 
June 23,1999, Reporters Worksheet. [R. 273-274] 
September 13,1999, Reporter's Transcripts, (three). [R. 275-276-277] 
The supplemental index, as filed with the Court on September 15,1999, 
ends and no other documents are found in the Trial Courts Record. However, 
activities that occurred, and are part of the Appellate Court's record, follow: 
1. June 22,1998, a motion to remand, for determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, was first filed by then Defendant's / 
Appellant's original counsel, Douglas D. Terry. Mr. Terry had also been the 
trial counsel. 
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2. September, 15,1998, said motion to remand was denied, 
without prejudice, by order of the Court; over the signature of James Z. Davis, 
Presiding Judge, [R. 252-253], as Terry could not lawfully bring this motion, 
against himself, while still representing this client. 
3. By that same order, a limited remand was directed to the 
Trial Court to determine if the Defendant / Appellant was entitled to new 
counsel for the appeal. 
4. January 15,1998, the Docketing Statement, filed by Trial 
Counsel, Douglas D. Terry, had one issue, ineffective assistance of counsel. 
5. May 24,2001, Defendant's/Appellant's Motion to Augment 
the designated record, due to an omission, pursuant to rule 22 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
6. June 8, 2001, that Motion was ruled moot when a court clerk 
found the missing transcript. 
7. October, 2001, Defendant / Appellant filed a Motion for 
Remand, under rule 23B, for an evidentiary hearing. 
8. November 2, 2001, Plaintiff/Appellee filed a Memorandum 
in opposition to the foregoing Motion. 
9. December 4,2001, Defendant's / Appellant's Rule 23B 
Motion was denied. 
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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution's Amendments V and XIV and the Utah 
Constitution Article I Sections 7,10 and 12. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 31,1995, Officer Matt Stoker, of the St. George Police 
Department, observed the Defendant driving on St. George Boulevard. [R. 275, 
p. 60-61] 
Because Officer Stoker had reason to believe Defendant was driving on a 
suspended license, he decided to pull Defendant over and investigate. [R. 275, 
p. 61-62] 
2. With Officer Doug Sargent assisting, Officer Stoker approached 
Defendant's vehicle and asked him if his drivers' license was suspended. 
Defendant confirmed that it was. [R. 275, p. 63-64] 
3. Officer Stoker told Defendant, he would check for outstanding warrants 
and that, if there were none, he would only issue Defendant a citation. 
However, he told Defendant that he would have to lock his vehicle and walk to 
his destination. [R. 275, p. 64] 
4. Upon contacting dispatch, Officer Stoker learned that Defendant was 
wanted on an outstanding bench warrant issued in a civil case. [R. 275, p. 65] 
Accordingly, Officer Stoker returned to the vehicle and informed Defendant that 
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he was under arrest on the bench warrant, and for driving on a suspended 
license. [R. 275, p. 65-66] 
5. Defendant exited the car as instructed, but balked when Officer Stoker 
attempted to handcuff him. [R. 275, p. 66-67] When the officers moved toward 
him, Defendant ran around to the other side of the car, swore at the officers, and 
began to run. [R. 275, p. 68-69] 
6. Both officers returned to their squad cars and pursued Defendant. [R. 
275, p.70] The officers chased Defendant a short distance before Defendant ran 
behind a home. The officers exited their vehicles and confronted Defendant in 
the backyard. They again informed him that he was under arrest and that he 
should stop resisting. Defendant refused to comply and continued swearing at 
the officers. [R. 275, p. 71] 
6. At some point, Officer Sargent noticed that Defendant had something in 
his hand. The officers asked Defendant what it was, and Defendant answered 
that he had his house keys. Upon closer inspection, the officers determined that 
Defendant actually held a pair of needle-nose pliers. [R. 275, p. 72] 
7. Realizing that the pliers could be used as a dangerous weapon, the officers 
backed up and, once again, informed Defendant that he was under arrest and 
ordered him to drop the pliers. Defendant refused. [R. 275, p. 74] 
8. In an effort to bring Defendant under control, and prevent the situation 
from escalating further, Officer Stoker sprayed Defendant with pepper spray. 
Defendant immediately turned and ran into the home. [R. 275, p. 75] 
9. The officers pursued Defendant into the hone and soon discovered him in 
the kitchen with several other people. Defendant turned to face the officers and 
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brandished the pliers at them. Officer Sargent drew his gun and instructed 
Defendant to drop the pliers. Again, Defendant refused and, instead, taunted the 
officers, telling them to go ahead and shoot him. [R. 275, p. 76-78] 
10. When Defendant ran toward Officer Stoker, the officer again sprayed 
Defendant with pepper spray. The officers were then able to wrestle Defendant 
to the ground and handcuff him. [R. 275, p. 79] 
11. Defendant continued to fight and struggle as the officers removed him 
from the home. As the Officers escorted Defendant to the squad car, 
Defendant's ex-wife, who had been inside the home during the struggle, 
followed them. As the officers were attempting to wash the pepper spray from 
Defendant's eyes, Defendant's ex-wife told Defendant that one of the officers 
had told her to shut up. Defendant asked the officers, who had told her to shut 
up. Officer Sherman Steffens, who had arrived to assist in the arrest, stated that 
he had told her to be quiet. In response, Defendant reared back and kicked 
Officer Steffens in the knee, causing him to collapse. [R. 275, p. 81] 
12. To restrain Defendant, and to prevent any further injury to anyone else, 
the officers placed restraints on Defendant's legs and attached the leg restraints 
to the handcuffs. Despite these restraints, Defendant continued to struggle and 
succeeded in biting Officer Steffens on the arm. [R. 275, p. 83-84] 
13. Finally, Defendant was placed in the back of a patrol car and transported 
to the jail. [R. 275, p. 84] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The failure of Defendant's trial counsel to "assure that an appealable 
record of all bench conferences were preserved is evident from the trial 
transcript. [R. 275, pp 85,101, R. 276, p 316] 
Defendant's trial counsel failed to request a new trial based on a juror's 
equivocal comments, during the polling process. [R 276, p 357] 
Thus, the record on appeal is clearly adequate to validate these two 
claims. 
The Trial Court committed clear error by failing to record the bench 
conferences and address the equivocal comment of Juror Hafen. 
These errors, and failures, resulted in Defendant / Appellant being denied 
a fair and impartial jury, a unanimous verdict, and a complete and appealable 
record, denying his right to due process, as guaranteed by United States 
Constitution's amendments V and XIV and the Utah Constitution Article I 
Sections 7,10 and 12. 
ARGUMENT 
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE TARRELL McKAY 
HUGHES CASE BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE: 
1. THE TRIAL COURT LOST, OR FAILED TO KEEP, A NOTE, OR 
NOTES, WRITTEN TO THE COURT, BY THE JURY, AND 
NOTES WRITTEN BY THE COURT, TO THE JURY, DURING 
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DELIBERATIONS, AND FAILED TO MAKE, OR KEEP, ANY 
RECORD OF SAID NOTES. REFERRED TO IN TERRY 
AFFIDAVIT, (see addendum) 
2. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECORD ANY OF THE 
SIDEBAR CONFERENCES HELD DURING THE TRIAL, 
DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANT / APPELLANT OF A 
COMPLETE, APPEALABLE RECORD. 
3. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST A 
NEW TRIAL BASED ON A JUROR'S EQUIVOCAL COMMENTS, 
DURING THE POLLING PROCESS. [R 276, P 357] 
Hughes' case merits a remand for a new trial on the basis that the Trial 
Court failed to make any record revealing the communication, between the 
jury and the judge, during deliberations. The jury notes, referred to in the 
Terry Affidavit, are not referenced anywhere in the record on appeal. The 
record reflects no curiosity, on the part of the Court, about the statement of 
Juror Hafen, when being polled, post verdict; thus, surely, indicating prior 
knowledge on the part of the Court. [R 276, p 357) See State v Tumi, 2000 
UT 38 J 3, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (remanding case for new trial, where 
record on appeal was incomplete, because half of Defendant's trial was not 
recorded, could not be effectively reconstructed, and missing information 
was critical to Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on 
appeal). 
In failing to keep the note, or notes, or make any record of same, or to 
record, or in anyway make a record of, the sidebar conferences at which trial 
counsel's arguments would be expressed and preserved for appeal, the trial court 
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violated Hughes' constitutional right to an appeal, and his due process rights, to 
not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law; in that the record is 
incomplete, and he cannot adequately brief an issue that he legitimately raised 
before the court. Id.: see Utah Cont. Art, I, § 7 ("[n]o person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law"); U. S. Const., amend. V 
and XIV (same); Utah Const. Art. I § 12 ("(i)n criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases") 
In the present case, Juror Hafen, when polled by the Court, informed the 
Court that she had a question that, due to the lack of having been provided an 
answer, affected her ability to arrive at an opinion; one that would have changed 
the verdict for the Defendant / Appellant. [R 276, p 357] In Juror IleneHafen's 
response, she, stated, as to her finding of Defendant's / Appellant's guilt, 
"Because there was not clarification of one of my answers, yes, it is — 
[inaudible] questions, I mean. " 
There is nothing in the record to tell us what the juror's question was; 
thus, the question can not be addressed on this appeal. The record does not 
reflect any reaction on the part of the Trial Judge to the juror's response. 
See State v Russell, 733 P.2d at 164; 
The purpose of jury polling is to "determine that 
the verdict signed by the foreman is that of the 
individual jurors and not one that has been coerced or 
caused by mistake." (citing State v Agtuca, 12 Wash. 
App. 402, 529 P.2d 1159 (1974)); 
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Also see: M. J. Greene, Annotation, Juror's 
Reluctant, Equivocal, or Conditional Assent to 
Verdict, on Polling, as Ground for Mistrial or New 
Trial in Criminal Case, 25 A.L.R.3d 1149,1151-52 
(1969) (noting that juror's attitude toward verdict 
must be determined by the trial judge not only from 
the exact words used by the juror, but from all the 
circumstances, including the juror's expression and 
demeanor" and without extraordinary evidence to the 
contrary, "the determination of the trial judge will not 
be disturbed on appeal"). 
The law was clear, in 1997, that inquiry by the Trial Judge was required to 
ascertain the reason for the equivocal answer, and conditional assent, to the 
verdict. This record does not reflect any inquiry into the conditional assent to 
the verdict by Juror Hafen. See US v Hernandez-Garcia, 901 F.2d 875, 878 
(10th Cir. 1990) 
"In any case upon the appearance of any 
uncertainty or contingency in a jury's verdict it is the 
duty of the trial iudge to resolve that doubt, for there 
is no verdict as long as there is any uncertainty or 
contingency to the finality of the jury's 
determination.'" (emphasis added) (quoting United 
States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483, 489 (10th Cir. 1979); 
Cook v United States, 379 F.2d 966, 970 (5th Cir. 
1967)). To that end, "where a juror when polled gives 
an uncertain or equivocal answer, it would seem that 
before discharging the jury or directing it to resume its 
deliberations, a district judge should first attempt to 
clear up the uncertainty." 
The Court committed clear error by failing to assure that an appealable 
record was made of all bench conferences. There are a total of three bench 
conferences, reflected in the record, and none of the three were recorded. [R 
275, pp 85, 101, R. 276, p 316]. 
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A trial court has a statutory duty to maintain all critical papers, pertinent 
to the trial proceedings, in order to "create a record that an appellate court may 
use to evaluate" issues properly raised by Defendant on appeal, Studor, Inc. v 
Examining Bd. Of Plumbers, 929 P. 2d 46,49 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). and, in 
turn, to preserve and protect a Defendant's constitutional right to appeal. See 
Utah Const. Art. I § 12 (Defendant's right to appeal)' Ut. R. App. Proc. Rule 11 
(2000) establishes the court's duty: 
(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal. The 
original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any the index prepared by 
the clerk of the trial court, and tne docket sheet, shall 
constitute the record on appeal. 
(b) Pagination and Indexing of Record, (1) 
Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the 
clerk of the trial court snail securely fasten the record 
in a trial court case file, with collation in the following 
order: ... (c) all original papers in chronological 
order;. 
(d) Papers on Appeal. (1) Criminal Cases. All of the 
papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk 
of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. Id. 
(emphasis added) 
Hughes' right to appeal, under Article I, Section 12, of the Utah 
Constitution, plus his right under Rule 11 (a), - (b), and -(d), Utah R. App. P., 
amount to a due process right to the protections afforded therein. See Utah 
Const. Art. I § 7 ("{n}o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law"); U.S. Const. Amend. V & XIV (same). 
Accordingly, the Trial Court violated Hughes' due process rights when it 
failed to preserve the notes, to and from the judge and jury, in the record; thus 
compromising his right to appeal. See Tunzi, 2000 UT 3813. 
This Court, in West Valley City v Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Ut. 
App. 1999), set forth the analysis to determine the propriety of remand, and a 
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new trial, where a trial court omits, or fails to include, critical papers in the 
record: 
Due process "requires that there be a record 
adequate to review specific claims of error already 
raised." State v Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (Footnote omitted). However, we do not 
presume error simply because a record is incomplete, 
or unavailable. See id. at 560 (holding Defendant not 
"unqualifiedly entitled to a complete record") State v 
Morello 927 P. 2d 646, 649 Ut Ct. App. 1996, holding 
no presumption of "error simply because record is 
unavailable"). Rather, lack of an adequate record 
constitutes a basis for remand, and a new {trial}, only 
where (1) the absence or incompleteness of the record 
prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be 
satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e.. by affidavits or other 
documentary evidence); and, (3) the appellant timely 
requests the relevant portions of the record. See 
Russell, 917 P. 2d at 558-559 & n. 1; Morello, 927 
P.2d at 649; Littlefield v State, 114 N.M. 390, 839 P. 
2d 134,138-139 ) (N.M. Ct. App 1992); see also 
Emig v Hayward, 703 P. 2d, 1043,1048^9 (Utah 
19851 (requiring timely request for transcript or 
appellant assumes risk of loss); Department of 
Community affairs V Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614 P. 
2d 1259,1261 (Utah 1980) (although record was 
deficient due to loss of witness's testimony, resulting 
from tape recorder malfunction, affidavits cured 
defect); Tolman v Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P. 
2d 23, 27-28] n. 5 (Utah App. 1991) (stating, while 
minor omissions in transcript may be inconsequential, 
or may be corrected through affidavits, numerous 
omissions from transcript constitute grounds for new 
hearing), 
Id. at 17. Hughes case merits remand and a new trial under all of the Roberts 
factors. 
First, the "absence ... of [any notes, or any data, reflecting what was in 
the notes, or how they were handled,] prejudices" Hughes because the wording 
is critical to the analysis. If they are verdict-urging instructions, they are 
appropriate only if carefully phrased, so as not to interfere with a Defendant's 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury, and, ultimately, to a trial by a fair, and 
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impartial, jury. See Utah Const. Art. I § 10 ([i]n criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous"; Utah Const. Art. I. § 12(right to fair and impartial jury); U. S. 
Const, amend. V & XIV (same); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 21 (1999) ("[t]he 
verdict shall be unanimous"); Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-02 (holding verdict urging 
instruction was not erroneous); Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 30 (upholding "non-
coercive use of Allen charges because ... such charges [are] a reasonable and 
proper exercise of the court's power to guide the jury to a fair and impartial 
verdict"). 
See Colorado v Lewis, 676 P. 2d 682, 686 (Colo. 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
Unanimity requires a free and untrammeled 
deliberative process that expresses the conscientious 
conviction of each individual juror. Any judicial effort 
to avert a deadlocked jury must be approached with a 
sensitive regard for a juror's right to hold to his or her 
honestly held beliefs about the particular case. An 
instruction that constrains an individual juror to 
suspend these beliefs merely for the sake of returning a 
verdict is, to that extent, antithetical to the unanimity 
requirement. 
Under Lactod, a verdict urging instruction may be coercive, per se, or 
coercive under the circumstances of the case. 
Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 30 (citing Lowenfield v Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,237, 
108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1988) (citing Jenkins v United States, 380 U.S. 
445,446, 85 S. Ct. 1059,13 L. Ed. 2d 957 (1965) (per curiam)). Although 
"there is no prescribed 'ritual of words', indicating whether an Allen charge is 
coercive, "courts routinely examine the choice of words used by the court in its 
instruction, whether the instruction is verbal or written, in making this 
determination". Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30. For example, in Lactod, this Court 
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looked to a lengthy statement from the judge, read to the jury on the record, in 
deciding that the instruction was not coercive. Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 28, 30-31 
(instruction was neither coercive, per se. or under the totality of the 
circumstances). 
Again, in State v Brown, 853 P. 2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme 
Court relied on the transcript of the verbal instruction to the jury in holding that 
it was not coercive under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 861; see also 
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 235, 241 (holding Allen instruction proper under 
circumstances of case). 
The importance of the actual choice of words, used in a verdict urging 
instruction, is emphasized by the fact that the American Bar Association 
("ABA") has set forth recommended standards in order to avoid violating a 
Defendant's right to a trial by a fair, and impartial, jury, and due process right to 
a unanimous jury verdict. See ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury § 5.4 
Without the note, or notes, in the Hughes' case, Hughes is missing critical 
information that is pertinent to the analysis on appeal and, therefore, is 
prejudicial to his appeal, since he cannot effectively brief the argument for this 
Court. Indeed, it is impossible for Hughes, or this Court, to analyze whether the 
instruction contained "certain inherently coercive ideas", which might render it 
coercive, per se. Lactod, 761 P. 2d at 31. Hughes, and this Court, is likewise 
prevented from analyzing whether the note is coercive under the circumstances 
of his case. Id. at 30. Accordingly, Hughes is prejudicially damaged by "the 
absence [of the note]." Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17; see also State v 
Verikokides, 925 P. 2d 1255,1256 (Utah 1996) (an appellate "court cannot 
review a record that does not exist"). 
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The absence of the note merits a new trial for the added reason that the 
note "cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by 'affidavits or other 
documentary evidence).'" Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. In Tunzi, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that reconstruction of the missing record, in that case, 
was not feasible, given the nature of the issues on appeal, and the nature of the 
missing information. Tunzi 2000 UT 38 f 3. One half of the trial transcript was 
missing from the record. Id. In holding that a new trial was necessary, the 
Court reasoned that "[rjesolution of the [sufficiency of the evidence] issue 
[would] necessarily involve reviewing the evidence contained in the record." Id. 
Reconstruction of such a major portion of the necessary information would be 
"unduly burdensome", and would not "provide the detail necessary to resolve 
the issues on appeal." Id. Moreover, the "burdens and futility associated with 
reconstruction of a record are increased exponentially when the issue on appeal 
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence." Id. 
The reasoning, in Tunzi, compels a like conclusion in Hughes' case. As 
noted above the exact wording of a verdict urging instruction is particularly 
critical to the analysis on appeal. Accordingly, a mere summation of the note, 
based on an affidavit of someone's recollection, is not an effective means of 
restoring the record where a challenge to an Allen charge is made. Furthermore, 
the vagaries of human recollection, the length of time that has passed between 
now and Hughes' April 21st, 1997, trial, and the risk that memory may be 
altered as each interested party attempts to "fill in memory gaps", to suit their 
own interest, compound the difficulties that would exist if the note was 
reconstructed from memory. State v Long, 721, P. 2d 483,490 (Utah 1986) 
(discussing shortcomings of human recall, noting that people often tend to 
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"unconsciously reconstruct more detailed, logical, and coherent recollections of 
their actual experiences"). 
Moreover, the record is lacking any information that adequately indicates 
the substance of any instruction wherein the argument may be briefed. The 
pleadings do not contain any minute entries concerning the substance of the 
notes, or even their occurrence. The note, or notes, is not included with the jury 
instructions. [R. 67-96] 
In short, the missing note could not be "satisfactorily reconstructed" 
through affidavits, or other parts of the record. Roberts, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
17. The note, itself, is dispositive of the issue on appeal. See Tunzi, 2000 UT 
38 f 3. Moreover, "a reconstructed record would not provide the detail 
necessary to resolve the issues on appeal." Id. Finally the "burdens and futility 
associated with reconstruction are increased exponentially" because the issue on 
appeal requires analysis of its exact wording. Id. 
Hughes' timely, and vigilant, pursuit of the record on appeal distinguishes 
his case from those, where a lost, or incomplete, record was due to a defendant's 
undue delay, or inactivity. The Utah Supreme Court determined that a 
defendant's constitutional right to appeal was not violated, where the "difficulty 
in reconstruction the record was due, in large part, to the nineteen-month delay 
between {his} habeas hearing and the record reconstruction hearing." ,Emig, 
703 P. 2d at 1048. Similarly, a defendant's right to appeal was not violated 
where the defendant absconded and caused a seven-year delay in proceedings; 
during which time, the record of the original trial was lost. See Verikokides, 925 
P. 2d at 1257; see also Morello, 927 P. 2d at 648 (defendant was not entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea merely because transcript of his colloquy with trial 
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court, regarding his decision to plead guilty, was unavailable; rather, defendant 
bore risk that record would no longer be available when he waited nearly 12 
years to file motion to withdraw plea). 
Unlike the defendants in the aforementioned cases, Hughes has not 
absconded from the jurisdiction, or behaved in any other fashion, as to cause 
delay and increase the risk of the record being lost, or destroyed, over time. He 
filed a pro se Notice of Appeal November 20 1997, twenty-three (23) days 
after sentencing. [R. 137] He pursued replacement of his court appointed 
counsel when he determined that his appeal was not progressing. At all times, 
during the trial, and subsequently during his appeal, Hughes has been 
represented by court appointed counsel. Any delays, since the filing of his 
Notice of Appeal, have been due to their agenda, not Hughes'. See: Harris v 
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 01/26/1994) {Harris II} 
... In Harris I, we laid to rest any argument that 
delays by the Public Defender in filing briefs could be 
attributed to petitioners on the ground that the Public 
Defender requested the continuances on petitioners' 
behalf. Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1065. The record 
indicated that "the delay in preparing petitioner's brief 
on appeal [was] caused by the inability of [the Public 
Defender] to address petitioner's case in a timely 
fashion." Id. Because this delay was "forced upon an 
unwilling petitioner by reason of his indigency," we 
held it should not be attributed to the petitioner. Id. 
State v Visser, 31 P.3d 584, 2001 UT App 215 (Utah App. 07/06/2001) 
TJ14 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must establish (1) that his trial 
counsel's performance was "deficient," and (2) that he 
was "prejudiced" by the ineffective assistance. 
Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 
2052,2064 (1984). A counsel's assistance is deficient 
when a defendant "show[s] that. . . [it] fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688, 104 
S. Ct. at 2064. "The proper measure of attorney 
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performance remains simply reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms." Id. In determining 
whether counsel's performance was deficient, we 
must 'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action "might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'"" State v Garrett, 849 
P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,104 S. Ct. at 2065 
(citation omitted)). 
The sole issue, addressed in the Docketing Statement, filed by trial 
counsel, was Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The Affidavit of Trial Counsel 
[Terry Affidavit] (see addendum) validates the unrecorded activity during trial, 
and demonstrates the fact that these were activities he should have objected to, 
and taken steps to assure that a record was made, for the benefit of an appellate 
court. Had the questions of Juror Hafen been addressed, or answered, a different 
outcome could reasonably have been anticipated. 
CONCLUSION 
Hughes' constitutional rights to appeal, and due process, were violated 
when the Trial Court failed to record the sidebar conferences during the trial; 
failed to enquire, on the record, of Juror Hafen's equivocal response during the 
polling of the jury; and failed to make any record of enquiries by the said juror, 
or any other jurors; and failed to keep any written communications from the 
jury. 
Hughes was denied his right to effective representation during the trial by 
failure of his then counsel to: 
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(a) assure that a record was made of all bench conferences; 
(b) assure that a record was made of any juror's questions during 
deliberation; 
(c) object to, or adequately answer, questions submitted by the jury; 
(d) move for a new trial, based on one juror's comments during the 
polling process. 
Defendant / Appellant Tarrell McKay Hughes, requests this Court provide 
him due process of law by reversing this conviction and remanding to the Trial 
Court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th, day of February, 2001. 
BrendaWhiteley[7016f r j _ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true, and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing document was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, on 
this 6 day of February, 2002, to: Brett J. Delporto, Assistant Attorney 
General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P 0 Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 
84114-0854. 
Dated this 6* day of February 2002. O , 
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Case No: 971686-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
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TARRELL MCKAY HUGHES, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
ADDENDUM TO 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Article I, Section 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital 
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the 
jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist 
of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In 
civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
a 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have 
been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or 
at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
U.S. Constitution: Bill of Rights 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
b 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, 
or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support 
the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the 
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
c 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
d 
DOUGLAS D. TERRY (4158) 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435)628-4411 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
TERRELL HUGHES, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS D. TERRY 
> CaseNo.970686-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, DOUGLAS D. TERRY, being first duly sworn depose and say as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and represented the 
Defendant as his court appointed trial counsel in this case. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters contained herein with the exception of 
those matters asserted upon information and belief 
3. When the jury returned its verdict, the jury was polled. One of the jurors, in 
response to the question as to whether or not she agreed with the verdict, made a statement to the 
effect that because her question(s) had not been answered that she concurred with the verdict. 
4. It is my recollection that a question or questions were sent to the judge by the 
0s 
jury during deliberation. I do not have an independent recollection of what those question(s) were. 
5.1 do not know whether a record of the question(s) propounded by the jury was 
ever made by the court 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SATTH NAUGHT. 
DATED this / x w o£Sefteraber, 200J 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
) 
$$ 
) 
On this v\ day of September, 2001, personally appeared before me Douglas D. 
Terry, the signer of the above and foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same for the purposes therein set forth. 
MOTARYPinuC 
rr<JSovm,VTurm 
MYOOMtetr.ftUMt. 9TATBCFUTM | 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
J} 
